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English courts consider the validity of a talaq obtained abroad on the 
basis of the lex matrimonii, without examining whether the 
circumstance of the divorce, both factual and legal, offend English 
public policy. An anthropological inquiry into talaq obtained in most 
Muslim nations reveals that androcentric culture – as opposed to 
religious prescription as such – largely distorts the Koranic vision of 
this institution. This author suggests that English courts and the 
scholarly/religious community should entertain the notion of the 
contractual nature of nikah (marriage) in order to assess the 
consequences of the talaq. If a nikah is entered into without the 
wife’s unequivocal consent or under duress from family members 
then, as a contract, it may be declared voidable by the courts; the 
wife, however, would retain the right to seek redress from such a 
voidable contract. Moreover, besides comity and reciprocity, there is 
no other legal impediment as to why English courts cannot employ 
the Human Rights Act to counter foreign talaq obtained in violation 
of the wife’s fundamental human rights. This is particularly so where 
the wife repudiates the application of her personal law in favour of 
English family law, provided that this is done in a manner that does 
not expose her to accusations of apostasy. 
 
1. Introduction  
Divorce in Islam takes three forms: a) talaq ahsan, whereby the husband’s 
repudiation of the wife occurs when she is not menstruating and he has not had sexual 
intercourse with her; b) talaq hasan, which involves a thrice repudiation of the wife in 
periods consisting of at least three menstrual cycles, and; c) talaq bid’a, which is 
variation of the second option whereby the thrice repudiation occurs on a single 
occasion. The third type is generally dismissed by Muslim scholars as not only 
finding no place in the Koran but also for being in conflict with the spirit of Islamic 
law. The regulation of talaq and its place in Islamic family law is by means of 
particular verses in the Koran and by a significant body of hadith (oral tradition). 
Even so, the requirement of the thrice utterance is not evident from a simple reading 
of the pertinent verse (sura al-talaq).
1
 In theory, two witnesses are also required for 
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the completion of the talaq,
2
 but it is not clear whether their presence is required for 
all three utterances in the case of talaq hasan. Equally, there is no clear mention in the 
primary sources, especially in the Koran, as to whether the utterances need to be 
uttered to the wife or another person, or whether there is a requirement to receive 
notice of some sort prior to the registration of the divorce. The practice, of course, 
varies from school to school and from Sunni to Shia and this is also reflected in the 
statutory regulation of talaq in Muslim jurisdictions.
3
 However, the spirit of the Koran 
is evident; the process is not meant to release the husband by any means and for his 
sole benefit but to respect and protect the person of the wife, unless she has 
transgressed her marriage obligations. This spirit, as will be demonstrated in 
subsequent sections, is missing from the theory and practice of contemporary Muslim 
divorce laws, which have as a result bred a culture of abusive nikahs and talaqs. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the recognition of foreign talaq by 
English courts. The examination of the pertinent law is undertaken with the aim of 
establishing and understanding the attitudes of the stakeholders, namely the spouses 
as well as that of the judges. Therefore, a significant part of this paper involves some 
degree of anthropological inquiry. This is necessarily subject to the limitation that the 
author does not have access to his subjects and has not spent time with a community 
of male and female divorcees in order to study their attitudes at the time of marriage 
or following their divorce. Nonetheless, from a methodological point of view, it is 
fortunate that the majority of judgments on talaq, maintenance and child custody 
involving Muslims with a foreign element have involved a thorough examination of 
the parties’ lives and circumstances from the moment of the completion of the nikah 
contract to the pronouncement of the talaq and beyond. Hence, we are left with a 
historiography of the parties’ relevant time periods, as well as substantial excerpts 
from their statements as to their social circumstances in these periods. These are 
important because they provide a fairly accurate picture of the cultural circumstances 
of both the nikah and the talaq, as well as the social status of women and men from a 
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sociological and anthropological perspective. Religion, as will become evident, plays 
a very small part, if at all, in this analysis, precisely because the real contours shaping 
the talaq are quintessentially cultural. Given that the objective was to provide an 
overview of relevant practices the author limited himself to a sample of approximately 
fifteen representative cases. This by no means constitutes an exhaustive research, nor 
do the outcomes provide universal truths,
4
 which is in any event part and parcel of 
reflexive limitations inherent in the study of one human being by another.
5
 The 
sample is largely limited to relatively young Muslim women married abroad and 
against whom talaq was equally pronounced abroad. 
 
The first section of the paper identifies the treatment of foreign talaq by English 
courts, stressing their observance of Islamic law, irrespective if this would otherwise 
offend the forum’s public policy. We then go on to paint the parties’ attitudes to the 
divorce and its surrounding circumstances. The picture that arises is that of a distinct 
talaq culture where men abuse their right to initiate divorce and take full advantage of 
male-centred laws and practices to effectuate divorce without, in many cases, even 
telling the wife. The wives, on their part, narrate their exclusion from the talaq 
process and those that played little part in their nikah explain the life and expectation 
of a woman in a traditional androcentric society. What is striking in the latter cases is 
the transformation of the wives’ aspirations and livelihood following arrival and stay 
in England as compared to their former existence. The conclusion aims to employ the 
anthropological observations with a view to offering two interrelated suggestions. The 
first assumes the nikah in its original contractual form in Islamic law and presents it 
as such for the purpose of recognition and enforcement of the talaq. In this sense the 
talaq is nothing more than the possibility of repudiating a contract which both parties 
have accepted on the basis of (an assumed) party autonomy. Although the governing 
law will be that of the country where the nikah was completed the courts of England 
and Wales will not be impeded in an assessment of the contract’s fairness and should 
                                                 
4
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be able to import fundamental notions of justice and contract law to ascertain whether 
it is void or voidable. Moreover, human rights law (if not also public policy rules) 
should play a distinct role in the construction of foreign talaqs where the wife’s role 
in the original marriage contract was minimal and the husband is given unlimited 
power by foreign local laws and practices to obtain a divorce. 
 
2.  The Statutory Stance to the Recognition of Foreign Talaq 
Article 46(1) and (2) of the Family Law Act 1986 regulate the recognition of overseas 
divorce, annulment and legal separation in England. The position is simple. A talaq 
obtained outside England is enforceable therein – and hence the parties may further 
seek ancillary relief or resolve other financial matters – if the talaq is effective under 
the laws of the country in which it was obtained (lex matrimonii). This is irrespective 
if it was obtained by means of proceedings
6
 – whether judicial, religious or other – or 
by no proceedings whatsoever, as long as residency requirements are met, which need 
not concern us here. The focus, therefore, is not on the existence of proceedings 
leading to the pronouncement of divorce or other forms of legal separation, but rather 
whether the particular talaq is effective in the country obtained. English courts have 
clarified what constitutes effectiveness for the purpose of English law, discussed later. 
Effectiveness, in theory, should be construed in a manner that renders a talaq 
operative, that is, of producing legal effects for the parties. This can certainly be 
achieved without a formal registration, especially where the existence of a talaq is 
typically demonstrated in the country obtained by means of oral testimony. Such an 
approach would be consistent with the flexible and to some degree informal nature of 
talaq under classical Islamic law, not to mention its practice in many Muslim nations; 
i.e. the utterance of divorce thrice to the spouse or relatives without the need for 
further formalities. 
 
The fact that English courts have required some type of registration on the part of the 
parties as a prerequisite to recognition demonstrates that their focus is on legal 
                                                 
6
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certainty and formality as this is understood in western legal thinking, not on giving 
credence to all the particularities of talaq in its native legal context. In Sulaiman v 
Juffali the husband argued that a bare talaq in Saudi Arabia did not require a process 
of registration, this being a matter solely between man and God.
7
 In fact, the husband 
argued that the absence of an obligation to register talaq was part of Saudi legal 
practice and that the wife’s argument to the contrary went against their culture and 
societal values.
8
 In the later case of H v S the husband had failed to register his talaq, 
arguing that no such obligation existed. Acting upon expert evidence the court was of 
the view that although Islamic law in Saudi Arabia did not (at the time at least) 
impose a registration requirement, in practice “this is unheard of”.9 It went on to say 
that regulations increasingly require official proof of divorce and as a result unless 
proof of registration is furnished the talaq is non-existent in England.  
 
In most Muslim jurisdictions the registration of talaq or nikah (Muslim marriage 
contract) is not viewed as a legal requirement under the primary sources of Islamic 
law. This view has been expressed, for example, by the Pakistani Federal Sharia 
Court, emphasising that oral evidence is sufficient for the determination of a nikah 
and that a requirement to register was un-Islamic.
10
 The purpose of registration was 
relegated to filling purposes as a result. If this is true then older cases, such as 
Chaudhary v Chaudhary, which held that the mere announcement of divorce before 
witnesses did not amount to divorce proceedings under Article 46(1) are contrary to 
Islamic law developments and construction in particular countries. Such an approach 
therefore belies a desire for record-keeping which is understandable, given that 
litigation otherwise would depend on unreliable oral testimony, requiring the 
translation of affidavits of people to whom the courts could not have access. This is 
no doubt sound from a policy perspective and justifies a departure from classical 
Islamic law. As the court went on to note in H v S, there does not exist a system of 
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law in the world that does not register divorces as this would create a chaotic 
situation.
11
 
 
As will become evident in other sections, English courts, in their determination of the 
validity of talaq obtained abroad, have not concerned themselves with questions of 
public policy, particularly whether the conditions by which the talaq was obtained 
would in this jurisdiction have offended the rights of women.
12
 For a variety of 
reasons, although the Law Commission had favoured that all talaq manifestly 
contrary to public policy be subject to discretionary stays by the courts, this view was 
rejected from the purview of Article 46.
13
 Hence, both the violation of fundamental 
rights and the disparity of the parties in the relevant process do not constitute 
impediments to the recognition of foreign talaq. Adherence to the spouses’ personal 
law is considered paramount.
14
  
 
Again, policy reasons suggest that non-recognition of a foreign talaq obtained in 
violation of fundamental human rights would in fact be injurious to the more 
vulnerable spouse. A recognition of talaq is more female-friendly because it allows 
the wife to claim ancillary relief and child custody against the husband, which she 
might not otherwise be entitled in the jurisdiction where the nikah and the talaq were 
                                                 
11
 H v S, paras 60-61. Nonetheless, in NC v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKAIT 16 it was accepted 
on appeal that in the region of Kashmir, which is not subject to the 1961 Pakistani Muslim Family Law 
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46(2) of 1986 Family Law Act. 
 
12
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jurisdiction as was the case in NA v MOT [2004] EWHC 471 (Fam), para 2, where the court examined 
the wife’s options for divorce under Iranian law. It held that if the wife wanted a divorce in Iran she 
would have to negotiate the amount of the marriage portion she would have to forgo in exchange for 
her freedom. If the price was too high she would be forced to remain married but in reality she would 
be separated. Ultimately, however, the court applied Iranian law and did not seek to deviate from it in 
order to alleviate the wife’s position. See also Otobo v Otobo [2002] EWCA Civ 949. 
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obtained.
15
 Practice in English courts certainly demonstrates that this outcome has 
materialised, although in the majority of cases decided not all women were destitute 
and at the sole mercy of abusive husbands.
16
 In the majority of cases the husbands are 
aware that they can easily obtain talaq in Muslim jurisdictions – whereas the khula is 
far more cumbersome for women
17
 – they perceive this as a global advantage, being 
oblivious to the fact that the recognition of a foreign divorce in places such as 
England entails serious financial consequences. 
 
3.  The Utterance of the Talaq: The Perspective of the Husband and the Use of 
“Culture” 
The courts have not taken a position on the utterance of the talaq, primarily because 
of the policy considerations cited in the previous section. Yet, for the purposes of this 
paper, the practice of the utterance raises interesting anthropological questions. The 
fact that all that is needed is a thrice utterance of divorce by men before a few 
witnesses provides men with a perception of cultural and legal superiority over 
women and in the process removes from them any sort of stigma associated with 
divorce.
18
 This is further reinforced by the notion that talaq is a spiritual matter 
between man and God (although this argument is used sparingly) and so in turn gives 
the impression that no social consequences for the male spouse arise from the talaq. 
Of course, one should not over-generalise, but must instead see the talaq from the 
perspective of the direct stakeholders, namely judges, the husband and the wife. As 
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 In J (A Child) Application for Return of a Child to Saudi Arabia, Non-Convention Country [2004] 
EWCA Civ 417, para 63, the judge noted that if his decision was for the child to be returned to Saudi 
Arabia this would have to be made conditional upon the father obtaining talaq in a sharia court. He 
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 A distinct exception is the case of DB v ZA and Others [2010] EWHC 2175 (Fam), which did not 
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already stated in the introduction, this author has relied on a selection of cases in order 
to flesh out some anthropological observations. These observations in no way suggest 
a conclusive outcome and should not be interpreted as such. 
 
The absence of something akin to equality of arms is evident in the practice of talaq 
in the Muslim world.
19
 In Sulaiman v Juffali we discussed the husband’s claim that 
this was a matter between himself and God and not for the courts.
20
 This reference by 
husbands to religion and culture as a basis for dismissing the applications of their 
spouses for ancillary relief and other financial settlement is prevalent in the majority 
of cases. In practice, this socio-religious dimension of the talaq has a direct impact on 
its regulation by the executive and the courts, which may be far removed from its 
original conception in the primary and secondary sources of Islam. In H v H the court 
revealed that although under Pakistani law the husband’s failure to register the talaq 
was fatal to its validity, the talaq was otherwise valid if the thrice utterance was never 
made to the wife but to third parties instead.
21
 Similar cases have arisen in the case 
law. In Arshad v Anwar the husband instituted talaq proceedings in England without 
notifying the wife or making an effort to obtain a registration. At the same time 
entertaining talaq proceedings in Pakistan without equally making any effort to notify 
the wife.
22
 Clearly, the husband was under the perception, as well as legal advice, that 
obtaining a talaq was a mere formality which could be dispensed with at ease. In the 
case at hand, the wife was unable, despite her best efforts, to even find out if a talaq 
had been obtained.
23
 In A v L the spouses, originally from Libya, had been together 
for a long time (close to thirty years) and had raised a large family. They spent their 
time between England and Egypt, with the husband conducting most of his business 
                                                 
19
 See NA v MOT, ibid note 11, para 2(8) where it was held that although in “theory” the wife is entitled 
to seek a divorce, maintenance and financial rights, this is non-existent in practice. The burden of proof 
(essentially a breach by the husband of a term in the marriage contract) in order for the wife to succeed 
in bringing khula action is very high. 
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 Ibid 7, paras 27-29. 
 
21
 H v H [2007] EWHC 2945 (Fam), para 38. As a result of its registration the talaq in question was 
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activities in Cairo, and as a result he spent substantially longer periods there than the 
wife, who remained in England during most of his business excursions. The husband 
at some point became enamoured with a younger girl and began an affair while at the 
same time abusing and belittling his wife.
24
 While in Egypt he pursued talaq 
proceedings without notifying the wife, although he claimed to have demanded a 
divorce over the phone. The English court had no qualms arguing that the husband 
was dishonest and devious in obtaining talaq in Egypt.
25
 Quite clearly, the husband’s 
intention in obtaining a divorce in Egypt was in the knowledge that “the maintenance 
rights of the wife [in Egypt] are of a most restricted kind”.26 
 
In yet other cases it was not even clear whether a talaq had been obtained, even 
though the husband claimed as much although he admitted not addressing his wife on 
the matter.
27
 In this case, the wife was illiterate and was married off by her family, 
whereas in the situations described in the preceding paragraph both spouses possessed 
some degree of education. The relative ease by which men can obtain talaq is further 
reinforced by the ease they can shift through the requirements for nikah. In Babar v 
Anis, a British man with Pakistani roots was forced by his family into marrying a 
Pakistani bride without his divorce in England having become final. This was 
common knowledge to the families of both spouses in Pakistan and when asked to 
sign the nikah certificate by the imam the husband was not asked all of the twenty-one 
questions on the form, particularly whether he was currently married. Everything was 
arranged by the parents and the imam in order for it to be convenient for their ultimate 
purpose.
28
 
 
A notable characteristic in most of these cases is the claim of the husband that he was 
not particularly religious, yet adhering to the dictates of local culture, much of which 
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 A v L [2010] EWHC 460 (Fam), paras  40ff and 77. 
 
25
 Id, para 79. 
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 Id, para 35. 
 
27
 DB v ZA and Others, ibid note 16, where the closest thing to a talaq was a paper discussing 
compensation with the wife’s thumb print on it. 
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is influenced by religious considerations.
29
 In DB v ZA and Others the father claimed 
to be a secular Muslim but ultimately the court accepted that he, as well as his family, 
practiced honour killings.
30
 In the same case, the maternal grandfather appears as an 
honourable elder who is respected in the local Kurdish society and who justifies a 
possible honour killing of his daughter on the fact that he gave his word to the 
husband’s parents that she be betrothed to him. At the same time, however, there is 
significant evidence that the paternal grandfather had an affair with a younger woman 
who gave birth to a child but refused to marry her under pressure from his wife. He 
never once made an attempt to see his illegitimate child and did not pay compensation 
to his mistress despite his promises to the contrary.
31
 Yet, this is the same man who 
professes that honour killings are part of the Kurdish culture
32
 and was intent on 
killing his daughter simply because she refused to be with a man that raped, abused 
and threatened to kill her. 
 
This liberal invocation of culture by the male husbands discussed in these cases is 
emblematic of the fact that said “culture” is only meant to favour men. It pervades 
societies in all aspects and social relations. Because male domination is more potently 
justified by reference to culture, these men do not feel the need to rely to any great 
degree, if at all, on religion. Indeed, they are quite aware that a strict interpretation of 
talaq under classical Islamic law would not provide them with the same liberties as 
under “culture”, which has in turn permeated the legal institutions of divorce in the 
pertinent nations. Another explanation for minimising the degree of their religious 
adherence is perhaps concerned with their perception of English judges as being 
disinclined towards Islam and Islamic law. They may well think that culture is neutral 
and therefore a more attractive proposition. No doubt, these cases clearly demonstrate 
that in societies where men dominate and dictate legal and social norms the conditions 
                                                 
29
 In NA v MOT, ibid note 11, para 2(n) the husband claimed that he did not expect his Iranian wife to 
be a virgin because he was rather liberal having lived in England close to twenty years. The judge did 
not accept this claim. 
 
30
 DB v ZA and Others, ibid note 16, para 44. 
 
31
 Ibid, para 257. 
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for talaq will never really amount to a “proceeding” in the sense of Article 46(2) of 
the Family Law Act 1986. A statement from the wife, as redacted by the judge, on life 
in her Iranian-Kurdish village is illustrative of this male-centred culture: 
[She] describes coming from “a very orthodox Moslem background”. She too 
expresses a belief in God, but is not herself religiously observant. She speaks 
of being part of a household where the males can, in effect, do no wrong. They 
govern all that goes on in the house. Women have no rights. Strict conformity 
to “this cultural model” is required. She was uneducated whilst her brothers 
were schooled. She was barely allowed out of the home to mix in the local 
area, and not being schooled had no chance to forge friendships there. She 
alleges that her mother was the victim of the same autocratic methods within 
the household, and could not interfere when her father and her brothers 
required her to behave in a certain way.
33
 
 
4.  Judicial Attitudes to Claims of Matrimonial Cultural Relativism 
The husband in DB v ZA produced a written document whereby he alleged that one of 
the terms of the divorce were that he was designated as his son’s carer. He justified 
this on the basis that it would be expected in his culture on account of the mother’s 
health issues and her behaviour towards the son. He went on to argue that in any event 
his son would pass to him at the age of 7 as a matter of tradition.
34
 The judge’s 
reaction to this statement is revealing of the difficulties in understanding what 
constitutes and feeds “culture” in societies traditionally associated with theocracy and 
male dominance in the western psyche. Wood J, thus stated: 
 
This remark is of some interest, for it shows that despite his posture as a less than 
traditional member of his society, and with a belief in God but not a belief in the 
Islamic religion or its observances, he is at heart deeply entrenched in the mores of his 
society.
35
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Wood J is at pains to comprehend how it is possible for a person not to be religious in 
a society that cherishes religious adherence, while at the same time fully observing 
that society’s mores and culture. The husband’s belief system is by no means 
incongruous. Culture is a complex phenomenon with scholars such as Geertz viewing 
it as a web of shared meanings expressed through public communication, not in the 
sense of sharing the same knowledge and skills but in the sense that persons who in 
fact share a culture share a common world view that is expressed through common 
symbols and language.
36
 Hence, religion may be merged into culture and become part 
of a shared view even though in its new cultural form it is different from its original 
religious underpinnings. Hence a person may observe religious rules without being 
religious because the rules in question are part of culture. This in fact demonstrates 
that in societies where men manipulate religious rules to their advantage, as is the 
case with nikah and talaq, said rules are hardly axiomatic or immutable. Rather, in a 
very implicit way they are not taken for granted by the principal enforcers, that is, 
men. In turn, it is obvious that immutability is afforded to cultural norms. This 
observation coincides with Bourdieu’s distinction between doxa and opinion. For 
Bourdieu, in order to assess whether the members of a group share or do not share 
common values one must distinguish that which is taken for granted by the group and 
which is beyond discussion (doxa), such as faith in God or unquestionable adherence 
to a political system, and things that are actively discussed among group members and 
are not therefore axiomatic (opinion).
37
 
 
Family court judges in England are experienced and despite having entertained 
numerous talaq cases they allow the parties to produce expert opinions on Islamic 
law. The problem is that the strict focus of Article 46(2) of the Family Law Act on 
compliance with local legal formalities, which are in turn justified on Koranic 
grounds, does not allow judges to examine, as opposed to simply cite, the place of 
culture in spousal relations, other than as obiter dicta. But, of course, if culture was 
allowed to play a meaningful role in talaq-related proceedings the judges would be 
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forced to apply human rights and public policy considerations in the relations between 
the spouses. 
. 
There are of course some notable exceptions to this general trend, albeit the ultimate 
effect is limited. In NA v MOT the husband, a British-Iranian national went to Iran to 
marry and subsequently brought his new wife back to Manchester.
38
 The marriage 
contract was drawn up and officialised in Iran, listing twelve possible grounds upon 
which the wife could seek a divorce from the husband. As has already been 
mentioned in the previous section, given that obtaining a khula in Iran is exceptionally 
difficult, if the wife wished to be released from her marriage she would be forced to 
accept a considerable cut to her marriage portion, otherwise she would have to endure 
a non-existent marriage. Upon accepting jurisdiction, as well as the particular terms of 
the nikah, the court emphasised that it was bound to take the cultural perspectives of 
the parties into consideration, but only with a view to pronouncing fair financial 
outcomes. This is essentially an anthropological approach, which merits citation: 
I also have to consider the cultural background of this case. ... [A] factor when 
carrying out the court’s function is to have regard to the parties’ cultural 
mores. ... [A]n English judge should give due weight to the primary cultural 
factors and not ignore the differential between what the wife might anticipate 
from a determination in England as opposed to a determination in the 
alternative jurisdiction,  including that as one of the circumstances of the case. 
... Thus I will take into account the agreement which the parties reached and 
determine how the Iranian court would have been wont to deal with this case. 
 
i. If the Husband had divorced the Wife by way of talaq or failed to give her a 
divorce at all, then, in my view, in Iran she would be entitled to retain the 
whole of her marriage portion. 
ii. If the Wife wanted a divorce, because she does not have sufficient grounds 
in Iran, she would have been bound to enter into a negotiation in order to agree 
what percentage of her marriage portion, if any, she would sacrifice for her 
freedom. 
                                                 
38
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I take these matters fully into account.
39
 
 
The court’s anthropological approach is limited as is undoubtedly its assistance to the 
wife. What the courts can, and ought to do in such situations is apply the foreign law 
as this is found, but import such an Islamic interpretation which favours an equitable 
result. This is particularly potent given that the theory and practice of talaq in the 
Muslim world is wholly divergent and there are very few scholars that would be 
prepared to defy the express provision of the Koran which forbids a man to 
unjustifiably and treacherously inflict a divorce on his wife, especially without 
sufficient maintenance and financial provision.
40
 Some thought must also go into 
scholarly input with regard to the wife’s contractual status in entering into the 
marriage contract, especially where this is repudiated unjustly and unfairly. Such a 
construction, however, requires consent among the judicial and academic 
communities in the UK, as well as an input from the entire Muslim community in the 
country. 
 
Unlike employment and immigration tribunals where judges have demonstrated 
stereotypical attitudes towards Muslim men,
41
 this is not the case with the family 
courts.
42
 The law in this area does not provide them with the freedom to question 
culture, let alone dismiss it. In those cases where the judges did discuss cultural issues 
it was solely from the perspective of a neutral observer and where some criticism of 
the inferior status of women was offered, this was always obiter dicta. As a result, the 
                                                 
39
 Ibid, para 6. 
 
40
 Koran 65:1, 65:7-10. 
 
41
 In Abusabib v Taddese (unreported), the plaintiff was a prominent Sudanese diplomat, a considerate 
family man, who was accused, along with his wife, by his Ethiopian nanny of serious crimes, including 
attempts at forced religious conversion. Despite character witness statements in his favour and a string 
of false statements by the nanny, in addition to what was evidently an attempt by her to secure asylum, 
successive employment tribunals refused to dispense justice in the case. No doubt, a Muslim, 
Sudanese, diplomat, male is perceived in the same light as the press paints Muslim diplomats and their 
entourage, especially from so-called pariah nations, without taking personal circumstances into 
consideration. 
 
42
 In H v H, Ibid note 21, para 74, the court noted that the social stigma for bigamy was so acute in the 
husband’s community that it is improbable that he would have assumed such a risk or course of action. 
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courts have not given us any degree of anthropological observation and of course it is 
not their job to do so. The current Head of the International Family Justice unit,
43
 
Thorpe LJ, should engage in a study with a view to ascertain the aspirations of weaker 
parties to talaq disputes settled in England and Wales. Particular regard should be 
given to nikah based on an arranged marriages in which the wife had little input. 
Given that Brussels II
44
 does not apply to Muslim divorces obtained outside the EU, 
English courts are not constrained by the particular dictates of this Regulation. There 
is no reason why the Human Rights Act and ECHR jurisprudence cannot inform and 
regulate talaq-related proceedings in England. 
 
5.  The Aspirations of the Wife 
It has already transpired that the aspirations of the wife are inconsequential to the 
impact of a talaq obtained abroad, even against her wishes or in the absence of her 
consent. To western lawyers the contractual nature of marriage and the possibility of a 
unilateral repudiation by the strongest party do not sit well with the very concept of 
marriage or the equality inherent in the principle of party autonomy in its application 
to contracts. It is assumed, for sound policy reasons, that irrespective of the equality 
and fairness of foreign talaq law, the wife was aware of the situation and her status 
from the outset. Hence, she is no worse off when she comes before an English court 
than when she was in the country where the nikah and the talaq were obtained. In 
fact, the subsequent remedies in England and Wales, in addition to the input from 
social services and social welfare, will ensure that her life is far better. As 
emphasised, although talaq is easily obtained by males, it renders an opportunity for 
the wife to free herself from the shackles of a violent, uncomfortable and in many 
cases unwanted formal relationship. 
 
The courts, although obiter dicta – except in cases that did not involve the recognition 
of a talaq, as with protection measures to avert honour killings – have not shied away 
from pointing out the inferior status of wives-to-be in many Muslim communities 
                                                 
43
 Available at: <http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/international/international-family-
justice>. 
 
44
 Council Regulation 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 [2003] OJ L 338/1, repealing Regulation 
1347/2000. It is conveniently known as Brussels II or Brussels IIbis. 
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around the world. In A v L the court emphasised the restricted nature of maintenance 
rights affordable to women in Egypt, even though in the case at hand the husband had 
clearly committed adultery and had been abusive to his wife.
45
 In DB v ZA the court 
accepted evidence suggesting that the wife’s marriage had been part of an agreement 
between her father and another man, which although clearly a bad marriage, was a 
matter of honour for the father; hence the betrothed had no say in the matter.
46
 In J (A 
Child) the judge was willing to accept that life for an educated, active, Muslim 
woman in Saudi Arabia must be very restrictive, even if her husband is westernised 
and liberal.
47
 These are just a fraction of the cases where the courts have been at pains 
to emphasise the inferior status of women both culturally and from the perspective of 
equality of arms in talaq proceedings. 
 
In all the cases where the wife was either a naturalised British citizen or had just 
established her habitual residence in the UK there is a clear trend. Whatever the 
cultural circumstances of the particular marriage, the parameters of the talaq, or the 
level of education, in every case the wife has sought to improve her personal situation. 
Being constrained by the limitations of the Family Law Act relying on the parties’ 
personal law, advise is sought from the rights-centred English family law. This would 
be inapplicable, but the wives are eager to demonstrate the injustice suffered from the 
male-dominated application of talaq in particular and Islamic family law in general. 
As a result, it is not far-fetched to claim that in the vast majority of cases wives 
perceive the talaq as an unfair and biased process, further reinforced by the great 
difficulties inherent in obtaining a khula. Equally, relatively younger wives exhibit a 
desire to make profound changes in their lives upon coming to the UK. This has 
involved: taking up primary, secondary or tertiary education, setting up their own 
business, finding independent employment (i.e. not having to rely on male 
maintenance) and to a very large degree breaking some of the bonds with patriarchal 
and socio-cultural structures associated with particular Muslim societies. To this one 
                                                 
45
 A v L, ibid note 24, para 35. 
 
46
 DB v ZA, ibid note 16, para 62. 
 
47
 J (A Child), ibid note 15, para 24. 
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may add a relatively steady, albeit probably small, number of conversions to other 
religions, particularly evangelical Christianity and Jehova’s Witnesses, although for 
obvious reasons there is very little data on the subject. The fact that the younger 
generation of non-British Muslim women against whom talaq has been sought in 
Muslim jurisdictions are making a conscious break with their culture is indicative of 
the view which suggests that several institutions and practices within the broader 
umbrella of the Sharia are anything but liberating for women. In all of the cases 
surveyed in this paper the female viewpoint, even if not expressly stipulated, has been 
that the practice of talaq (and for some also the nikah) and the manner with which it is 
allowed to exist is injurious to women. 
 
The judiciary clearly identifies a problem between foreign talaq law and culture. This 
problem is quite pervasive in anthropological research and is not found exclusively in 
Muslim societies. It may be summed up as follows: Where the established mores and 
social institutions of a particular society are oppressive against one of its composite 
segments (religious or racial minorities, women, aliens, etc) they are preserved as 
culture only on account of the oppression and not because of a broader consensus. Of 
course, the vast majority of those born within an oppressive culture and who are 
unaware of the opposite side of the coin will appear to an external observer as though 
they relish their status.
48
 This unfortunate state of affairs is often the paradigmatic 
argument in favour of cultural relativism in societies where the oppressed have no 
voice, no education and no opportunities. In the case at hand, the culture of talaq 
seems at peace with the Muslim world’s universal culture, but this is only true within 
traditional Muslim societies (even those living in Western nations). When there is a 
departure from such traditional culture as a result of a talaq decided in the UK, with 
the wife now living there, the wife no longer supports the (male-centred) culture of 
talaq or its associated institutions.
49
 This should serve as an indication that if the talaq 
                                                 
48
 No doubt, there are those who do not espouse this view and instead see no oppression of women 
within Islam or the use of sharia by men as a tool for oppression. See G Marranci, The Anthropology of 
Islam (Berg, 2008). 
 
49
 Talaq and related institutions could therefore be described in light of the theory of androcentrism. 
Perkins Gilman who studies this phenomenon as early as 1911 described it as a fixation on the male 
and masculine perspectives as the origin of all things and the basis of culture and history. In this 
context only masculinity is normative whereas everything else is described as other. See CP Gilman, 
The Man-Made World (Cosimo Inc, 2007, reprint from the 1911 original edition). 
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is indeed viewed as a contract in English law, following its Islamic root, then the 
courts must offer some thought on the underlying principles of party autonomy and 
whether or not in many cases the wife is but a third party to such contract. This notion 
is analysed slightly more elaborately in the following section. Whatever the case, it is 
not wise to dismiss or ignore the intra-cultural clash in Islamic family law, 
particularly in the areas of marriage and divorce. 
 
6.  Some Sensible Conclusions on the Basis of Human Rights and Law of 
Contract Considerations 
There is a clear trend in Europe and English courts in particular towards dismissing 
Islamic law as the governing law of contracts on the ground that it is not the law of a 
national legal system and that in any event it is far too indeterminate for the courts to 
consider.
50
 This is also true to a large degree in the field of investment arbitration, 
despite the fact that conflict of law rules have no application there. Although such 
interventions, both judicial and statutory, offend the cardinal principle of party 
autonomy, they are justified on the basis of legal certainty.
51
 In the case at hand, a 
talaq premised solely on Islamic law could equally be subjected to another governing 
law by the courts – assuming it is regarded as a contract. But, sole reliance on Islamic 
law as such is rare. Modern talaqs are generally obtained by reference to the laws and 
procedures of national systems of justice, irrespective of the fact that their primary 
source is Islamic law given that the talaq originates from the Koran. Yet, domestic 
family laws in Muslim nations as has been demonstrated in this paper are far more 
indeterminate than general Islamic law, where the pertinent regulation in the primary 
sources is undisputed. In some of the cases surveyed it was not even clear if a talaq 
had been pronounced, whereas in others the male party suggested that no formal 
                                                                                                                                            
 
50
 Beximco Pharmaceuticals v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC, [2004] 1 W L R 1784. This outcome is 
justified on the basis of Art 1(1) of the 1980 Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations, OJ L 266 (9 October 1980), which clearly states that it is applicable to “contractual 
obligations in any situation involving a choice between the laws of different countries”. 
 
51
 It is true that sometimes the courts go a bit too far in dismissing the parties’ contractual desires, as 
was the case in Jivraj v Hashwani [2010] EWCA Civ 712, paras 28-29. There the Court of Appeal held 
that the appointment of an Ismaili arbitrator in the parties’ arbitration clause was void because it 
constituted religious discrimination in the sphere of employment. The Supreme Court ultimately 
reversed this decision. Jivraj v Hashwani [2011] UKSC 40. 
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requirements were required and without exception expert witnesses were invited in 
order to clarify the relevant laws. This in no way demonstrates legal certainty in the 
Muslim jurisdictions under consideration.  
 
Clearly, English courts must at least entertain the possibility of examining the nikah 
as a contract, as this is its legal form in Islamic law and national laws. On this basis, 
the nikah may be interpreted just like any other contract, taking into consideration, of 
course, the financial and personal consequences that accompany it.
52
 Just like any 
other contract, it is subject to a governing law and the general rules underlying 
contracts, including also their dissolution. Surely, where a party to a contract lacked 
the necessary volition (i.e. there was no assent on the part of the wife) this fails to 
produce any legal effects on account of being voidable. However, because of the 
sensitive nature of the marriage contract, especially on the vulnerable party, the wife 
should be given the opportunity to accept the terms of the contract in order to retain 
her married status. This is essentially the remedy afforded to the aggrieved party to a 
voidable contract. Alternatively, if she were to decide that the nikah should be 
declared void ab initio her marriage would be declared void (or voidable depending 
on the classification of the breach) retrospectively, but given that element of 
compulsion
53
 she would be entitled to particular terms of compensation and ancillary 
relief. Ordinary family law would regulate other matters, particularly in respect of 
parental responsibility. This suggestion is obviously a radical departure, which 
requires significant intellectual input from the scholarly and religious community, 
particularly whether it is deemed necessary for the wife to denounce her personal law 
– not her religion - in favour of the secular family law of England.54 
 
                                                 
52
 See I Bantekas, Freedom of Religion in Transnational Contract and Commercial Transactions, 
forthcoming in P Petkoff, M Evans (eds.), Changing Nature of Religious Rights under International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2013). 
 
53
 Duress renders a contract void, as opposed to the voidable effects arising from the lack of assent. 
  
54
 Given that this may be construed in some quarters as apostasy, the choice of substantive law in such 
disputes (i.e. preferring English law over Islamic law) is not without grave consequences for the wife. 
The wife will of course denounce the statutory law of her country but because this will be grounded in 
Islamic law as such, accusations of apostasy may still be levelled, although in the opinion of this author 
they are wholly without merit. 
 
Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law 
   
 
 
   
 59 
To avoid such problems, the courts may alternatively construe the wife’s personal law 
in light of human rights principles if Parliament is disinclined from allowing the 
courts to make public policy determinations. This by no means requires a radical 
departure of the nature described above. The application of fundamental rights by the 
courts already constitutes an exception to the principle whereby local courts are not 
permitted to offend international comity by frustrating sovereign acts of foreign 
nations. If this were not so then all members States to the ECHR would be forced to 
accept all rights violations – from countries outside Europe – as valid and as a result 
one would not be able to afford asylum to those subject to persecution. This is clearly 
an absurd proposition. The House of Lords has authoritatively held that a woman was 
justified in seeking asylum in the UK as a result of discriminatory family laws in 
Lebanon derived from the sharia.
55
 There is no question therefore that one’s personal 
law in no way trumps the applicability of human rights and that such a determination 
by the courts is not viewed as offending the rule of comity. However, in order for this 
result to come about it is necessary for the wife to denounce her personal law in 
favour of the lex fori, which, as already noted, may create more problems for the wife 
both culturally and from the perspective of criminal law (apostasy). In such cases, the 
courts should adopt a common construction to Islamic family law which imports 
human rights notion without a need for the wife to denounce Islamic law as her 
personal law. Although this will alleviate all of the aforementioned problems it will, 
most probably, open Pandora’s Box that renders England and Wales the preferred 
matrimonial forum for dissatisfied Muslim wives across the globe. Hence, it is crucial 
that the implications of this proposal be studied carefully and that only the range of 
cases discussed here are allowed further. Such an experiment may actually provide 
the necessary impetus around the world for other nations to follow suit. Moreover, it 
is not unlikely that in time civil society in the Muslim world employ these 
developments in order to infuse more fairness in Islamic family law. 
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